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THE RECENT HISTORY OF
CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES
Abstract: This article explores factors in the financial, legal
ments that have significantly influenced the development
committees. Particular emphasis is given to the actions of
Exchange Commission and the American Institute of Certified

and social environof corporate audit
the Securities and
Public Accountants.

The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) decision requiring that
all listed corporations have audit committees as of June 30, 1978,
made audit committees an integral part of the corporate organization.
The concept of an audit committee is not new. Audit committees
first attracted attention in the late 1930's when the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and New York Stock Exchange encouraged their establishment after the McKesson and Robbins case.
In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number
of corporations that have formed audit committees [AICPA, 1978].
A 1970 survey by R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neuman showed that 32
percent of the corporations responding had audit committees,
while a repeat of the survey in 1976 showed that 87 percent had
audit committees [Mautz and Neuman, 1977]. Congress, the SEC,
the accounting profession and others have expressed an interest
in and support for audit committees.
Actions of the Securities and Exchange

Commission

In 1940, the SEC first recommended the establishment of audit
committees in Accounting Series Release No. 19. This was issued in
response to the McKesson and Robbins, Inc. investigation. The
release proposed that, to assure auditor independence, a committee be selected from non-officer board members to nominate
auditors and arrange details of the engagement.
In Accounting Series Release No. 123, issued March 23, 1972,
the SEC stated its long interest in corporate audit committees, and
concluded with the following statement:
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To this end, the Commission, in the light of the foregoing
historical recital, endorses the establishment by all
publicly-held companies of audit committees composed of
outside directors and urges the business and financial
communities and all shareholders of such publicly-held
companies to lend their full and continuing support to the
effective implementation of the above-cited recommendations in order to assist in affording the greatest possible
protection to investors who rely upon such statements.
The stated intention of these recommendations was to impress
on the auditor his responsibilities to investors, particularly the need
for independence. The SEC noted in Accounting Series Release No.
126, issued July 5, 1972, that the existence of an audit committee
of the board of directors, particularly if composed of outside directors, should also strengthen such independence.
In 1974, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 165
which, among other things, added the following provision to
Regulation 14A of the proxy rules:
If the issuer has an audit or similar committee of the
board of directors, state the names of the members of the
committee. If the board of directors has no audit or similar
committee, so state.
In recent years, the SEC has strongly endorsed or required, as a
result of enforcement proceedings, that individual corporations
establish audit committees. In the matter of National Telephone
Company, the SEC discovered the following facts:
(1) The company faced "serious cash flow difficulties.
(2) The company made public disclosures which did not
disclose problems but which reported high earnings
and projections of growth.
(3) Outside directors were aware of the company's
troubled financial condition and were also aware of
the optimistic disclosures.
(4) The company had an audit committee of three outside
directors, but the committee never met.
(5) Outside directors did not take meaningful steps to see
to it that adequate disclosure be made [SEC, January
1978].
With regard to the audit committee, the SEC concluded:
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Finally, the facts developed during this investigation
demonstrate the need for adequate, regularized procedures under the overall supervision of the Board to insure that proper disclosures are being made. Such procedures could include among other things, a functioning
audit committee with authority over disclosure matters,
or any other procedure which involves the Board of Directors in a meaningful way in the disclosure process. With
such procedures, the corporation's shareholders and the
public should be more adequately protected from haphazard or fraudulent disclosure [SEC, January 1978].
The case of SEC v. Killearn resulted in a consent decree in which
the company agreed, among other things, to form an audit committee of three outside directors. The SEC specifically stated that
duties of the committee would include:
(1) Review the arrangements and scope of the audit and
the compensation of the auditor.
(2) Review with the independent auditor and the company's chief financial officer the company's internal
accounting controls.
(3) Review with the auditor the results of the audit,
including —
(a) The auditor's report.
(b) The auditor's perception of the company's
financial and accounting personnel.
(c) Cooperation received by the auditor.
(d) Steps to make the audit more efficient.
(e) Significant unusual transactions.
(f) Changes in accounting principles.
(g) Significant adjustments proposed by the
auditor.
(h) Recommendations by the auditor with regard
to internal accounting controls.
(4) Inquire concerning deviations from the company's
code of conduct and periodically review that code.
(5) Meet at least twice a year with the company's financial and accounting staff to review internal accounting and auditing procedures.
(6) Recommend to the board the retention or discharge of
the independent auditors.
(7) Review all public releases of financial information.
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(8) Review activities of officers and directors in dealing
with the company.
The audit committee would also be authorized to conduct investigations related to carrying out its duties and to approve settlements of certain litigation involving the company's officers.
The SEC underscored the importance it places on an audit committee in an enforcement action concerning misleading interim reporting. In the case of SEC v. Mattel, Inc., it accepted Mattel's consent to establish an audit committee. As a part of the ensuing settlement, the court ordered that the company appoint a majority of
unaffiliated directors and that it establish a financial controls and
audit committee among whose major functions would be a review
of financial controls, accounting procedures, and financial statements disseminated to the public.
In the consent decree arising from SEC v. Lum's, et al., the court,
as part of the settlement of the SEC's allegation of manipulations
and proxy fraud, ordered that a standing audit committee be established. The audit committee was to consist of two or more members
of the board of directors who were not officers or employees of the
company and whose function would be to review the auditor's
evaluation of internal controls and to oversee other required evaluations of casino operations, personnel, and security.
When submitting its report on its inquiry into the reason for the
Penn Central collapse to a House subcommittee, the SEC noted
that:
The Commission, taking a look at the future, has paid
increasing attention to the role, the qualifications, the
responsibilities, and the independence of corporate
directors, which appear to be called for. Last month the
Commission released a statement endorsing the establishment of audit committees composed of independent directors. The staff report points up the critical importance of
the whole subject of the responsibility of directors, the
greater utilization of public and independent directors, the
professionalization of their function, providing staff support for directors and judging their performance not on the
basis of hindsight but on the basis of the reasonableness
of their judgment in the circumstances and at the time it
was exercised.
In 1976, the SEC again underscored its interest in audit committees, this time as a means of deterring questionable and illegal
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corporate payments and other practices. In its report to the Senate
on "Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices,"
the Commission wrote:
Actions to further enhance the creation by public corporations of audit committees composed of independent
directors to work with outside auditors would serve as a
valuable adjunct to these legislative proposals.
The importance of the role of the board of directors, independent audit committees, and independent counsel has
been illustrated by the Commission's enforcement actions
in the area of questionable or illegal corporate payments.
Significantly, in some of these cases no audit committee
existed. In others, with a single exception, audit committees either operated only during a portion of the time
when the questionable payments were alleged to have
been made, or were not wholly independent of management. Accordingly, the resolution of these proceedings
typically has involved establishment of a committee comprised of independent members of the board of directors,
charged to conduct a full investigation, utilizing independent legal counsel and outside auditors, to conduct the
necessary detailed inquiries.
The thoroughness and vigor with which these committees
have conducted their investigations demonstrate the importance of enhancing the role of the board of directors,
establishing entirely independent audit committees as
permanent rather than extraordinary, corporate organs
and encouraging the board to rely on independent
counsel.
Acting to further strengthen the independence of auditors, the
SEC in September 1977 proposed a rule to require disclosure in a
company's proxy material of audit fees and services and approval
thereof by the board of directors or its audit committee. The text
of the proposal included the following comments:
It is desirable for all public companies to have audit
committees composed of independent directors and ways
are being considered by which such committees might be
encouraged or required.
The Commission believes that objectivity and independence are enhanced if the auditor deals with an audit
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committee of independent directors or the board of directors in determining services and fees. In order to provide
investors with knowledge of whether the board of directors or audit committee has approved all services provided
by the auditors, the Commission proposes to require disclosure of whether such approval has taken place.
More recently, in response to the recommendations of U.S. congressional subcommittees, the SEC urged the AICPA to require
audit committees as a condition of an independent audit. Speaking at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Fifth National Conference on Current SEC Developments
on January 4, 1978, Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the SEC,
stated:
The profession must take whatever steps are reasonably
available to it — such as insisting that their clients maintain audit committees — to insure and enhance its independence. If the profession is reluctant to take steps
of that nature voluntarily and of its own accord, the
Commission will need to understand why and how that
reluctance can be reconciled with a profession which
desires to maintain the initiative for self-regulation and
self-discipline.
Harold M. Williams commented again on the importance of audit
committees in a paper presented at Carnegie-Mellon University
on October 24, 1979. He stated that:
Audit committees are critical because of the fundamental
role which the independent auditor plays in corporate accountability and the special trust which the public places
in the auditor's work. With the wide acceptance of the
concept of the audit committee, the next question which
must be faced is the definition of the committees' responsibilities. At present, many audit committees are,
undoubtedly, not yet working fully effectively, and some
may serve more to provide windowdressing rather than to
add substance to the accountability process. The development of a better consensus as to the minimum responsibilities of audit committees should be an important
priority.
SEC regulation is assumed to be in the public interest, and the
SEC's support for the development of audit committees gained
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momentum due to the declining corporate image in the public
sector. The August 9, 1976 issue of Business Week, began a review
of a book on the world of business by stating that "American business has seldom been held in such low regard as it is today. A
succession of scandals, ranging from the collapse of Penn Central
to ITT's misadventures in Chile to the illegal payoffs of Gulf, Lockheed and scores of others, has given business a corrupt and deAntibusiness and anticorporate attitudes
humanizing image. .
were not new in American political history, but perhaps never before had the critics been more strident in their accusations, more
zealous in their crusade for reforms. Public confidence sagged;
public regulation proliferated. Proposals abounded for more accountability and more control of corporate activities. And there
was the expectation that outside directors would become more
involved in monitoring corporate conduct and governance
[Schornack, April 1979].
Since the 1940 issuance of Accounting Series Release No. 19,
the SEC has consistently shown its support of corporate audit committees. Through several court cases it has required certain individual corporations to establish audit committees and has prescribed definite duties for them. In addition, Accounting Series Releases Nos. 123 and 165 addressed the issue of audit committees
and further stated the SEC's endorsement of these committees.
Actions of the New York Stock Exchange
The first major endorsement for the establishment of audit committees came from the New York Stock Exchange in 1939, also as a
result of the McKesson and Robbins case. The Exchange's report
stated, ". . . where practicable, the selection of the auditors by a
special committee of the board of directors composed of directors
who are not officers of the company appears desirable."
For over twenty years the Exchange has required all newly listed
companies to have at least two outside directors. In 1973, the Exchange published a 'white paper' which stated that an audit committee "no longer represents a corporate luxury, but has become a
necessity."
At the urging of the SEC, on January 6, 1977, the NYSE adopted
a requirement for all listed companies to maintain an audit committee. It specifically stated:
Each domestic company with common stock listed on
the Exchange, as a condition of listing and continued list-

Published by eGrove, 1986

7

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 13 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 9

116

The Accounting Historians Journal, Fall, 1986

ing of its securities on the Exchange, shall establish no
later than June 30, 1978, and maintain thereafter an audit
committee comprised solely of directors independent of
management and free from any relationship that, in the
opinion of its board of directors, would interfere with the
exercise of independent judgment as a committee member. Directors who are affiliates of the company or officers
or employees of the company or its subsidiaries would
not be qualified for audit committee membership.
Thus, the audit committee became a required part of the corporate organization for all companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.
Actions of the American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants

In July 1967, the AICPA executive committee statement on audit
committees of board of directors recommended that publicly owned
corporations appoint audit committees. Specifically, the committee stated:
The executive committee of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants recommends that publicly
owned corporations appoint committees composed of outside directors to nominate the independent auditors and to
discuss the auditor's work with them.
Wide adoption of this practice would represent a further
step in the continuing improvement of corporate financial
reporting to the investing public. Audit committees can
be a constructive force in the overall review of internal
control and financial structure and give added assurance
to stockholders as to the objectivity of corporate financial
statements.
Audit committees can assist their full boards of directors
in matters involving financial statements and control over
financial operations. They can also strengthen the positions
of managements by providing assurance that all possible
steps have been taken to provide independent review of
the management's financial policies and operation. This
is good for the company and good for the public.
In July 1977, the AICPA board of directors again urged the
establishment of audit committees and urged AICPA members to
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encourage corporations to establish audit committees. The board
has also asked the American Stock Exchange and regional exchanges to adopt audit committee requirements similar to the requirement of the New York Stock Exchange.
Report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. In its
report issued in January 1978, the Commission an Auditors' Responsibilities (which was established by the AICPA) stated:
The board of directors, with outside members and an
audit committee when appropriate, is the best vehicle for
achieving and maintaining balance in the relationship
between the independent auditor and management. Therefore the Commission believes that steps should be taken
by boards, auditors, and when necessary, by regulatory
authorities to help assure that boards will actively exercise
this opportunity. Where appropriate to the size and circumstances of the corporation, board members should
include independent outsiders, and an audit committee
should be formed.
Special Committee on Audit Committees. In early 1978, the AICPA
appointed a Special Committee on Audit Committees to study
whether the AICPA should require that companies establish audit
committees of their boards of directors as a condition of an audit
by an independent public accountant. Under consideration by this
special committee were such questions as whether audit committees should be required to strengthen auditor independence, and
should a requirement for audit committees specify duties to be performed by the committee.
As a supplemental issue, the committee was also asked to consider whether the independent auditor should be required to be
present and available to answer questions at the annual meeting of
stockholders. While this issue is not directly related to audit committees, it does involve similar questions of applicability and implementation.
The special AICPA committee, which was formed in response to
congressional and SEC recommendations for requiring corporate
audit committees, concluded that it was not possible to sustain the
considerable burden of identifying the necessity of an audit committee requirement. The AICPA reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission that while it continues to support the concept
of audit committees for publicly owned corporations, it has found
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no reasonable basis for issuing a technical standard requiring their
establishment. The committee pointed out that it does not find
audit committees necessary for the maintenance of auditor independence or for performance of an audit in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. The AICPA committee also
stated, however, that it is convinced that audit committees can be
helpful to both corporate directors and to independent auditors.
In addition, the committee stated that any Institute requirement
would be viewed as an intrusion into the area of corporate governance and recommended that the accounting profession urge other
bodies such as the stock exchanges and the National Association
of Securities Dealers to encourage or require committees for
publicly held companies.
While the AICPA is unwilling to make the existence of an audit
committee mandatory before an independent audit can be performed, it has consistently shown its support for audit committees.
The AlCPA's expressed belief in the value of the audit committee
has contributed to their significant increase in number and importance.
Actions of Congress
While the accounting profession, the SEC and the NYSE have
advocated the audit committee for many years, Congress has only
recently expressed its interest in the matter. Senate Bill 3379, introduced May 5, 1976 by Senators Church, Clark and Pearson in
response to the publicity involving questionable corporate payments, had as one of its requirements that companies establish
audit committees made up of outside directors. The bill also would
have required that outside directors constitute at least one-third
of the total board membership. There was, however, no action
taken on this bill.
In its 1976 report on an investigation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives (the Moss Committee), was critical of
board of directors performance in general and specifically noted
the desirability of audit committees. The following is an excerpt
from that report:
A director must be willing to devote considerable time
to his important and continuing responsibilities. A director
elected because of demonstrated expertise should be
expected to manifest that expertise in fulfillment of his
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responsibilities and should be compensated appropriately.
The majority of the board should be detached from management and from any other conflict of interest, e.g.,
association with the company's investment banker or
corporate counsel. The board should provide itself with an
independent staff. A board's key audit committee should
be comprised of a majority of independent directors who
adopt rules to govern the committee's proceedings. The
audit committee should have available to it independent
expert advisors. Likewise, the nominating committee
should be comprised of a majority of independent directors. Assuring the independence of the board and its key
auditing and nominating committees as well as holding
directors to professional standards of performance are
critical to building an effective system of corporate accountability to protect public investors as well as a corporation's customers, suppliers, and competitors.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed December 19,
1977. This Act made recordkeeping and an internal control system
for all public companies a matter of law. Interpreters of this Act
have subsequently suggested that audit committees could provide
a vehicle for insuring that the provisions of the Act are met. For
example, Leonard M. Savoie, CPA, vice-president and controller of
Clark Equipment Company, Buchanan, Michigan, and former executive vice president of the AICPA, spoke on some of the practical
problems of monitoring compliance with internal accounting control systems under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Savoie
suggested that, to assure compliance, companies institute special
procedures including annually distributing corporate policy statements and guidelines to all management personnel and authorizing
internal auditors and lawyers to investigate and report to the audit
committee on violations of the conduct guidelines. Dennis R.
Beresford and James D. Bond, in an article in the Financial Executive stated that the immediate effect of the internal control provision of the law will be for management, audit committees, and
independent auditors of public companies involved in international
trade to challenge more rigorously systems of internal control with
a broad question similar to the following:
How does the company's system of internal control provide reasonable assurance that an illegal foreign payment does not occur [August 1978]?
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The Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (the Metcalf
Committee) stated the following in its November 1977 report:
The subcommittee strongly believes that the accounting
profession or the SEC should immediately require that
publicly owned corporations establish audit committees
composed of outside directors as a condition for being
accepted as a client by an independent auditor.
Given this new interest on the part of Congress, a possibility
looms that new legislation may require boards of directors of all
publicly held companies to establish and maintain such audit committees. The principal concern is that such legislation could conceivably go on to establish specific rules and regulations governing the responsibilities and performance of audit committees and
boards of directors in general [Arthur Andersen & Co., 1978].
Increases in Responsibilities

of Directors

At least part of the explanation for the suddenly increased
enthusiasm for corporate audit committees is the increased awareness of the legal responsibilities of directors. A large number of
articles in periodical business publications have emphasized the
increasing scope of director responsibility [Mautz and Neuman,
1977]. For example, a May 11, 1974 editorial in Business Week includes the following:
The Securities & Exchange Commission's suit against
the old management of the bankrupt Penn Central Railroad
abruptly extends responsibility for corporate misdeeds to
a broad new area. In effect, the SEC is saying that anyone
connected with the company who was in a position to
know what was going on and to do something about it
will be held liable along with those who actually committed
the offenses. Applying this philosophy to the Penn Central
case, the SEC did not stop with bringing suit against . . .
the former president and . . . the former top financial
officer. It also included as defendants three outside directors of the company.
In an article entitled "The SEC Looks Harder at How Directors
Act," [Business Week, February 2, 1976], the following comments
are included:
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Last week's dismissal of Gulf Oil Corporation Chairman,
Bob R. Dorsey, by the company's board suggests that
some directors are already worried. Gulf's directors reportedly fear that the SEC would hold them liable for a
failure to act in disciplining management implicated in
illegal acts.
Even outside directors without knowledge of wrongdoing
may be legally obligated to ferret out the facts for themselves. That is the thrust of a consent decree that the SEC
negotiated last summer with Theodore Kheel and John
Castellucci, the two outside directors of Sterling Homex
Corporation when insiders were allegedly practicing fraud
in hiding the company's financial deterioration.
A book review in the April 26, 1976 issue of Business Week
commences with this statement:
Corporate scandals have become such everyday occurrences that they hardly evoke surprise anymore, but
until a few months ago, at least, one question always
popped up in their wake: where were the directors when
the price fixing, bribing, or polluting was going on.
Corporate directors, faced with such charges and assertions, can
scarcely continue in ignorance of their risks and responsibilities.
To the extent that corporate audit committees are perceived as a
means of reducing such risks, they are likely to be a welcome
addition to corporate practice [Mautz and Neuman, 1977].
Because of limitations of time and resources, the board's responsibility is particularly heavy and, in recent years, directors
have been facing intensifying challenges:
(1) Companies have increased in size, diversity and complexity.
(2) Directors find it virtually impossible to be knowledgeable about and discuss every facet of their directorate
companies.
(3) The number of lawsuits against directors has increased, not only because of board actions but also
because of actions by management.
(4) The directors' obligation to exercise reasonable care
in the fulfillment of their responsibilities to shareholders is underscored by the trend toward litigation
[Coopers & Lybrand, 1976].
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Corporate boards of directors must meet the challenges of their
changing duties and responsibilities in order to fulfill their role
within the corporate organization. The audit committee can be an
important aid in this endeavor.
Other Actions Supporting the Establishment of Audit Committees
The Corporate Director's Guidebook, prepared by a subcommittee of the American Bar Association, states that it is desirable that
boards of directors establish audit committees. The audit committee is described in this publication as "the communication link between the board of directors as representatives of the stockholders,
on the one hand, and the independent auditors on the other hand."
Some states have audit committee requirements. For example, a
recently enacted statute of Connecticut requires that certain corpoartions of that state with at least one hundred stockholders must
establish audit committees [Connecticut General Statutes Annotated, 1980].
In Canada, the provisions of the Business Corporations Act include the following:
(1) The directors of a corporation that is offering its
securities to the public shall elect annually from
among their number a committee to be known as the
audit committee to be composed of not fewer than
three directors, of whom a majority shall not be
officers or employees of the corporation or an affiliate
of the corporation, to hold office until the next annual
meeting of the shareholders.
(2) The members of the audit committee shall elect a
chairman from among their members
(3) The corporation shall submit the financial statement
to the audit committee for its review and the financial
statement shall thereafter be submitted to the board
of directors.
(4) The auditor has the right to appear before and be
heard at any meeting of the audit committee and shall
appear before the audit committee when required to
do so by the committee.
(5) Upon the request of the auditor, the chairman of the
audit committee shall convene a meeting of the committee to consider any matters the auditor believes
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should be brought to the attention of the directors
or shareholders.
Many segments of the business community and the general public
have shown interest in and support for corporate audit committees.
These segments may differ in the purposes for which they support
audit committees and in the objectives they hope will be achieved.
However, a historical review of the development of audit committees
shows that all interested segments expect the committees to
strengthen the corporate image to the general public.
While the composition of audit committees has been addressed
by the SEC, the NYSE, the AICPA and Congress, only the SEC has
issued any specific duties to be performed by audit committees,
and this has only been done in specific cases for individual companies. Without guidelines to maintain some consistency and
standardization of functions and responsibilities for all audit committees, the goals for which these bodies support corporate audit
committees may not be achieved.
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